



According to the standard deﬁnition, a Bayesian agent is one who
forms his posterior belief by conditioning his prior belief on what he
has learned, that is, on facts of which he has become certain. Here
it is shown that Bayesianism can be described without assuming that
the agent acquires any certain information; an agent is Bayesian if his
prior, when conditioned on his posterior belief, agrees with the latter.
This condition is shown to characterize Bayesian models.
JEL classiﬁcation numbers: C72, D80, D83
1 Introduction
This paper studies the dynamics of beliefs, that is, the way agents change
their prior belief into posterior belief. The standard assumption made in eco-
nomics and game theory is that agents are Bayesian, which means that poste-
rior beliefs are formed from prior beliefs by conditioning on acquired knowl-
edge. The most commonly used models for Bayesian agents are Harsanyi
type spaces. It is shown here that Bayesianism, as expressed by type spaces,
can be interpreted diﬀerently. A change of belief, according to the suggested
interpretation, is not necessarily a result of acquiring new information or
knowledge. The only knowledge that is necessarily involved is knowledge
of the change itself. We show that the description of Bayesian agents by
type spaces can be characterized without assuming the acquisition of any
knowledge leading to the change.
After deriving these results, I discovered that similar results have already
been obtained by Gaifman (1988). Here we put these results in the context
∗The author acknowledges helpful comments by Pierpaolo Battigalli, Giacomo Bo-
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1of the economic literature on type spaces, and stress their implications to the
nature of Bayesian change of belief. We discuss Gaifman’s work, as well as
other related works in subsection 1.5.
1.1 Bayesianism deﬁned by learning
The Bayesian paradigm deals with the relation between an agent’s present
(posterior) and former (prior) belief. The common interpretation of Bayesian-
ism, in a nutshell, is that beliefs change by learning: the agent comes to know,
or at least becomes certain of, some facts. He, then, forms his posterior belief
by conditioning his prior belief on these facts. There are several expressions,
or metaphors, that are used to describe the agent’s learning of facts. In the
economics and decision theory literature an agents is said to observe a signal;
in models of games with incomplete information a player is said to learn his
type.
A formal model that depicts the relationship between the prior and the
posterior belief of a Bayesian agent consists of a state space with a probability
distribution on it which describes prior belief. Learning is introduced into the
model by adding a certain partition to the state space. The posterior belief
in a given element of the partition is the prior conditioned on this element.
According to the common interpretation of Bayesianism, an element of the
partition consists of all the states in which the agent observed a certain signal;
each such element is an event that formalizes the notion “all the information
that the agent has acquired”.
The underlying assumption of this interpretation of Bayesianism—that
beliefs change as a result of becoming certain of some facts—has been ques-
tioned and criticized by many students of subjective probability. Experience
tells us, according to the critics’ argument, that sometimes we change our
beliefs without being able to specify any relevant facts, of which we became
certain. Thus, for example, we may have some prior belief concerning the
honesty of a person and change it considerably after a short conversation
with him, in which no new facts are revealed to us. The change is the result
of an immediate impression that cannot be reduced to or explained by the
learning of any new fact about the person in discussion.
It seems that the very deﬁnition of a Bayesian agent, and the formal model
of type space, cannot describe any change of belief that is not the result of
gaining certainty concerning some facts. This model presumes the existence
of events—the elements of the partition—of which the agent is certain. How
can conditioning be carried out without such events? What would be the
meaning of Bayesianism without conditioning one’s belief on what has been
learned?
2This paper suggests that Bayesianism can be interpreted in a way that
does not require that beliefs change as a result of learning. This interpreta-
tion is made possible by an alternative deﬁnition of a Bayesian agent, one
which does not assume that the agent has learned and become certain about
any facts or events. We show that the structure of the Bayesian model, as
described above, is implied by our deﬁnition of a Bayesian agent, rather than
being assumed. In particular, this new deﬁnition implies that our agent must
be certain of some facts—he must be certain of his own belief. The elements
of the partition can now be interpreted as describing the certainty the agent
has about his own posterior belief. Thus, certainty under this interpretation
is not the cause of the change of belief, but its result.
1.2 Bayesianism deﬁned without learning
We discuss now, informally, our proposed characterization of a Bayesian
agent. We start by showing how such a characterization can be derived
from the standard formulation of Bayesianism, which assumes that posterior
beliefs are derived by conditioning prior beliefs on learned information. The
latter can be roughly expressed by,
posterior belief = prior belief as modiﬁed by the information the
agent has learned.
But the information the agent has learned is just what led him to revise his
prior belief, by conditioning, to the posterior one. Thus we can write,
posterior belief = prior belief as modiﬁed by the information that
made the agent change his prior to his posterior belief.
Now, the case that the agent has learned the information that makes
him change his prior belief to some speciﬁed posterior belief is precisely the
case that he holds this posterior belief. Indeed, the information leads to
the posterior belief, but also conversely; this belief includes what the agent
knows, or is certain of, that is, the information he has learned.
Thus, the event over which we condition is just the event that the agent
holds his present posterior belief, and we can reformulate the relationship
between prior and posterior beliefs as,
posterior belief = prior belief as modiﬁed by the posterior belief.
We derived this latter relationship between prior and posterior from the
standard deﬁnition of Bayesianism. But note that the formulation of this
3relationship does not assume learning, certainty, or knowledge of any event.
It describes a certain kind of consistency that posterior and prior beliefs
should satisfy, but not the way by which the posterior is derived from the
prior. In this paper we show that this latter relationship can be used to
characterize, or equivalently, to deﬁne Bayesianism. We prove that it implies
the standard model of Bayesian agents.
1.3 An illustration
To illustrate the proposed alternative deﬁnition, consider the following ques-
tion we pose to John.
“Given that next month you will believe the probability of Clinton
completing a full term to be at least .3, and the probability of
Saddam Hussein continuing to reign until the year 2010 to be at
least .8, do you agree, now, that the probabilities of these events
are at least .3 and .8, respectively?”
We ask John to evaluate his prior concerning two events given some bounds
on his posterior belief concerning the same events. What we expect John
to answer, according to the deﬁnition of Bayesianism proposed here, is just:
“Yes.” That is, the conditioned prior should conform with the given posteri-
ors.
The reasoning that would lead John to give us this answer is simple. By
conditioning on the belief he may have in a month, John puts himself, right
now, in the same position he is conditioning on. What other answer could
we expect?
Our characterization of Bayesianism is a straightforward formalization
of the above dialogue with John; an agent is Bayesian if he answers in the
aﬃrmative to all questions of this form, as John does.1
1.4 The model
Formalizing the previous illustration requires a model in which we can iden-
tify the event that the posterior of a given event E is greater than or equal
to some number p. This, in turn, is made possible by making the posterior
depend on, and vary with, the points of the model. This is precisely the
main feature of type spaces as deﬁned by Harsanyi (1967-68); the type of
1The question posed to John concerns two events. As we show in section 4, we can
equivalently require that he answers in the aﬃrmative when asked about any number of
events. But it is not enough to ask him about only one event at a time.
4an agent, that is, his (posterior) probability over the state space, depends
on the state. In Harsanyi’s type spaces, or other similar Bayesian models,
it is assumed that the agent knows, or is certain of, his type. Here we do
not want to make any assumption of this kind, because we want to derive
the structure of Bayesian models, rather than assume it. Thus our models,
which we call belief spaces, are simpler and more general. A belief space
is a measurable space each point (or state) of which is associated with a
probability measure on the space; no further restrictions other than simple
measurability conditions are imposed.
1.5 Related literature
An important element of the principle introduced in the previous two sections
is a conditional probability p(E|C) where C describes the probability of some
events for a probability measure q. Several authors studied principles that
involve such conditioning. These principles, like the one we state here, require
that the conditional probability be consistent with the probabilities described
by C. Such principles are sometimes called Miller’s principle, although Miller
(1966), who ﬁrst introduced a principle of this kind, considered it paradoxical.
The various principles in this category diﬀer in the interpretation of the
probabilities p and q, and the speciﬁcation of the condition C.2 Here, p and
q are the prior and posterior probabilities of an agent. This is also the inter-
pretation given to these probabilities by van van Fraassen (1984) who calls
this principle Reﬂection. Lewis (1980) studied what he calls the Principal
Principle, in which p is subjective probability, while q is objective probabil-
ity. In Skyrms (1980), Halpern (1991, 1998), and Samet (1997, 1998b), the
probabilities p and q are the same. Gaifman (1988) labels p as the probability
of an agent, and q as that of an expert.
In this work, as well as in Gaifman (1988), C describes the probabilities of
two (or more) events, one of which is E. In some works it is a full description
of the probability q. In Skyrms (1980), Halpern (1991, 1998), and Samet
(1997, 1998b), where p and q coincide, C describes only the probability of E.
The way C describes the probability of an event also varies. Here it is
given as a lower bound on the probability. In Gaifman (1988) and Halpern
(1991, 1998), it is given by lower and upper bounds, and in Skyrms (1980) C
describes the exact probability. These diﬀerences are technical and of minor
importance.
2It is possible to state similar principles for non-quantitative beliefs. See, for example,
Battigalli & Bonanno (1997) who study the condition that believing an event is equivalent
to believing that it will be believed at a later time.
5Until Gaifman (1988), none of the works that discussed Miller’s principle
in its various forms proposed any set-theoretic model in which such principles
can be studied rigorously. The main problem facing such modeling is the
identiﬁcation of C, which describes certain probabilistic statements, with an
event. Harsanyi (1967-68) faced the same problem when he analyzed games
with incomplete information. The diﬃculty there stemmed from the need to
describe beliefs of players about other players’ beliefs. Hence, such beliefs
have to be described by an event. His model, the type space, is deﬁned as the
product of type sets, one for each player, where a type of a player is deﬁned
as a probability distribution on the type of other players (or even the whole
space with the restriction that the player is certain about his type). This
model has been modiﬁed and simpliﬁed by Mertens & Zamir (1985) under
the name belief space. Here we adopt a somewhat less restrictive model
then theirs under the same name. In his modeling, Gaifman, unaware of
the solution proposed by Harsanyi, arrived at the same solution, a model in
which beliefs, given as probability distributions over a probability space, or
using another terminology, a state space, vary with the states.
Although very similar results were obtained previously by Gaifman (1988),
it is worthwhile to present this work for the following reasons. First, it is
appropriate to restate these results in the context and terminology of type
spaces and belief spaces; a model which has become so common in economics
and game theory over the last three decades, and is the main tool for de-
scribing Bayesianism in these ﬁelds. Philosophers too could beneﬁt greatly
by using these models. Although Gaifman introduced his set-theoretic model
in the philosophy literature, only a few papers in this area have used it.
Second, it is important to state the implications of these results for the
dynamics of belief change in general and for learning in Bayesian theory in
particular. Students of the dynamics of belief change have not been aware
of these implications. For example, Maher (1993) dedicates a whole chapter
in his book to belief change, but he does not make any reference to Gaifman
(1988). Contrary to the result of Gaifman’s work, he concludes that “It is
possible for the shift from p to q to satisfy Reﬂection without it being the
case that there is a proposition E such that q(·) = p(· | E).” In light of
the interpretation we suggest here, a conclusion like this needs at least to be
restricted appropriately.
1.6 Synopsis
In the next section we formally introduce belief spaces. The ﬁrst two subsec-
tions of section 3 discuss the two features that make belief spaces Bayesian:
that the agent knows his type, and that he forms his posterior belief by con-
6ditioning his prior on his type. Propositions 1 and 2 suggest new ways to
express the well known notions of type and of knowing-the-type, in terms of
belief-describing events. The usefulness of such expressions is demonstrated
in the proof of the main theorems. In Theorems 1 and 2 in Section 4 we
present two variants of the characterization of Bayesianism without learning.
The proofs are given in section 5.
2 Belief spaces
The model we use to formalize prior and posterior beliefs is a probability
space—the probability being the prior—in which each point is associated
with a probability over the space which is the posterior at that point. The
association of points, or states, with probabilities is the basic idea that un-
derlies Harsanyi type spaces. The details, as well as the name belief spaces,
are more in tune with the account of type spaces in Mertens & Zamir (1985).
Our model is simpler than theirs and than most type spaces in the litera-
ture, as no topology on the type space or the space of probability measures
is required, in the spirit of the model in Heifetz & Samet (1998).
Deﬁnition 1 A type space is a quadruple (Ω, Σ, µ, t) where,
1. Ω is a measurable space with a σ-ﬁeld Σ, generated by a countable ﬁeld
Σ0. The members of Ω are called states, and the members of Σ are
called events.
2. µ is a σ-additive probability measure on Ω, called the prior.
3. t is a map from Ω to ∆(Ω) — the set of all σ-additive probability
measures on Ω — such that for each E ∈ Σ, t(·)(E) is a measurable
real function. For a state ω, t(ω) is called the type, or the posterior,
of the agent at ω.
A special role is played here by events that describe the agent’s belief.
For each event E and real number p,
B
p(E) = {ω | t(ω)(E) ≥ p}
is the event that the probability ascribed by the agent to E is at least p, or
in short, the event that the probability of E is at least p. Events of the form
B1(E) are important and deserve a special name. We call B1(E) the event
that the agent is certain of E.
7The measurability condition on t is tantamount to saying that for each E
and p, Bp(E) is a measurable set. When a type space, as well as ∆(Ω), are
endowed with a topology, it is the standard requirement that the function t
be continuous that guarantees the measurability requirement on t.
Belief spaces as deﬁned here are very general objects. No restrictions are
imposed on the way beliefs are associated with diﬀerent states. No require-
ments are imposed on what the agent should know, or be certain of. No
relation between the prior and posterior beliefs is speciﬁed. Further struc-
ture is required in order to turn belief spaces into the Bayesian models used
in economics and game theory. We adopt a general deﬁnition of belief spaces
in order to show how our new deﬁnition of Bayesianism implies the structure
of Bayesian belief spaces.
3 Bayesian belief spaces
There are two requirements on a belief space that make it a model of a
Bayesian agent. Namely, that the agent is certain of his type and that his
posterior belief is generated by conditioning his prior belief on his type. In
the next two subsections we discuss and formulate these two requirements,
and in the last subsection we formally deﬁne Bayesian belief spaces.
3.1 Being certain of one’s type
We now express formally the phrase “the agent is certain of (or knows) his
type.” As the agent is certain of events, we need, ﬁrst, to describe “his type”
by an event. We denote by T(ω) the set of all the states in which the agent’s
type is t(ω), that is,
T(ω) = {ω
0 | t(ω
0) = t(ω)}. (1)
The set T(ω) is the natural candidate for the event “the agent’s type is
t(ω),” but we still need to show that this set is indeed an event, that is, a
measurable set. This follows from the next proposition.






where the intersection is taken over all real numbers p and E ∈ Σ, that
satisfy the required condition. This equality also holds when the intersection
is restricted to rational p and E ∈ Σ0, that satisfy the condition. Therefore,
as a countable intersection of events, T(ω) is an event.
8In addition to showing that T(ω) is an event, this proposition suggests
an alternative description of the event that the agent is of type t(ω): it is
the intersection of all the events that describe the agent’s belief at ω.
Now, with T(ω) being the event that the agent’s type is his type at ω,
we can deﬁne what it means for the agent to be certain of his type in a given
state.






Let us denote by C the set of all states in which the agent is certain of
his type, that is,
C = {ω | t(ω)(T(ω)) = 1}.
We show that C is a measurable set, and thus it is the event that the
agent is certain of his type. This follows from the next proposition, which is
used also in the proof of the main theorem.












where the intersection is taken, either over all p and E ∈ Σ, or over rational
p and E ∈ Σ0. Thus, C is an event.
We can now deﬁne the condition that the agent is certain of his type,
which is the ﬁrst requirement that Bayesian spaces should satisfy.
Deﬁnition 3 The agent is certain of his type in a belief space with a prior
µ, if he is certain of his type almost everywhere with respect to µ, that is, if
µ(C) = 1.




is the event that either the probability
ascribed by the agent to E is less than p, or else, if it is at least p, then the
agent is certain that the probability he ascribes to E is at least p. In short,
this is the event that if the probability he ascribes to E is at least p then
he is certain of this fact. Proposition 2 says that the event that the agent is
certain of his type is the event that he is certain of any belief of his that he
holds.
93.2 Conditioning on one’s type
Before we express formally the requirement that the posterior of the agent
is formed by conditioning the prior on his type, we discuss the simple case
in which the state space Ω is countable. In this case the requirement of
conditioning says that in each state ω, for which the prior probability of the






But (5) cannot serve as a general deﬁnition for all belief spaces, including
the uncountable ones, as in such spaces µ(T(ω)) may be zero for a set of ω’s
of positive µ-probability. Therefore we adopt a non-local deﬁnition (i.e., one
which is not deﬁned, like (5), for a single state) of conditioning on type. We
ﬁrst describe the logic of this deﬁnition for the countable case.
Multiplying both sides of (5) by µ(ω), and summing over states for which











After grouping terms in the right hand side of (6), corresponding to states







summation is over the T(ω)’s. By the Theorem of Total Probability, this is





It is easy to see that when the agent is certain of his type, then (7)
implies that (5) holds for µ-almost all ω. Indeed, suppose that (3) holds for
ω for which µ(ω) > 0 . By (7), for any E, µ(E ∩ T(ω)) =
P
ω0 t(ω0)(E ∩
T(ω))µ(ω0). By (3), this sum is
P
ω0∈T(ω) t(ω0)(E) µ(ω0). By (1), all the terms
are constantly t(ω)(E), and therefore the latter sum is t(ω)(E)µ(T(ω)), which
is (5).
Condition (7), unlike (5), is a global condition which is easily generalized
to all belief spaces in the following deﬁnition.




Observe that the invariance of µ does not imply that the agent is certain
of his type, as the following example demonstrates.
10Example 1 Let Ω = {ω1,ω2}, t(ω1) = (1/3,2/3), t(ω2) = (2/3,1/3), and
µ = (1/2,1/2). Then, µ is invariant but the agent is not certain of his type
in either state, as t(ωi)(T(ωi)) = 1/3, for i = 1,2.
Thus, in order that invariance implies conditioning on the agent type, we
have to assume also that the agent is certain of his type, as explained above
for the countable case.
The term invariance was chosen to describe a prior that satisﬁes (8),
because formally the function t can be thought of as a transition function of
a Markov chain on Ω. Formula (8) says that µ is an invariant probability
measure of this Markov chain. (See Samet (1998a), for implications of this
observation.) Mertens & Zamir (1985) and Feinberg (1996) also use (8) to
describe Bayesian priors.
3.3 Deﬁning Bayesian belief spaces
We are ready now to deﬁne Bayesian spaces in terms of the two properties
discussed above.
Deﬁnition 5 A belief space is Bayesian if
1. The agent is certain of his type.
2. The prior is invariant.
Bayesian agents are described, in the economic and game theoretic liter-
ature, almost exclusively by using Bayesian spaces, as deﬁned here—except,
perhaps, for small variations and diﬀerences in formulation.
4 Characterizing Bayesian agents
Our main result provides a characterization of Bayesian spaces which does
not make use of properties 1 and 2 in Deﬁnition 5. We show that a belief
space is Bayesian if and only if whenever the prior is conditioned on some
speciﬁcation of the posterior belief, it agrees with this speciﬁcation. A pos-
terior belief is speciﬁed, in this theorem, by events of the form ∩n
k=1Bpk(Ek),
which put bounds on the probability of ﬁnitely many events. Events like
this can approximate the posterior probability of any ﬁnite list of events to
any accuracy, as Bp(E) ∩ Bq(¬E) bounds the probability of E to be in the
interval [p,1 − q].
11Theorem 1 A belief space with a prior µ is Bayesian iﬀ for each n ≥ 1, all










for 1 ≤ m ≤ n, whenever this conditional probability is deﬁned.
No assumption is made in this condition that the agent acquires any in-
formation with certainty. That is, (9) does not depend on there being some
non-trivial event of which the posterior probability is 1. It suggests an in-
terpretation of Bayesianism as a simple requirement of consistency between
prior and posterior, rather than a description of the mechanism by which the
posterior belief is derived from a prior one, namely conditioning on acquired
certain information. Yet, (9) implies, by Theorem 1, that the agent is cer-
tain of his type. Being so, according to the suggested interpretation, does
not represent the learning with certainty, of any new facts (signals, in the
vernacular of economists) which initiate the updating of the prior. Rather,
certainty of type reﬂects the capacity of the agent to be certain of his own
(posterior) belief, (in concert with the presentation of T(ω) in Proposition
2) and as such it is the result of the updating, and not its cause.
The following theorem states that even the restriction n = 2, the condi-
tion (9) is suﬃcient for a belief space to be Bayesian.
Theorem 2 A belief space with a prior µ is Bayesian iﬀ for any two events








whenever this conditional probability is deﬁned.
Next, we consider a restriction of (10) to conditioning events of the form
Bp(E)∩Bq(¬E). Conditioning both E and ¬E on this event, yields by (10),







This is a natural requirement, as the the probability of E is conditioned
in (11) on an event which concerns just the posterior belief on E. The
stronger requirements, (9) and (10), allow including in the conditioning event
information about the posterior of events other than E. These conditions add
to (11) the requirement that the only part of the posterior belief which is
relevant as condition for the prior of E is the posterior probability of E.
It turns out, that the weaker condition (11) is not suﬃcient to guarantee
that a belief space is Bayesian. We can still state the following implication
of (11).
12Proposition 3 If in a belief space with a prior µ, (11) holds for any event
E and numbers p and q, whenever this conditional probability is deﬁned, then
µ is invariant.
The following example demonstrates that (11) does not imply that a belief
space is Bayesian.
Example 2 Let Ω = {ω1,ω2 ω3}. The agent’s type function is: t(ω1) =
(0,1/2,1/2), t(ω2) = (1/2,0,1/2) and t(ω3) = (1/2,1/2,0), and the prior is
µ = (1/3,1/3,1/3). It is easy to check that (11) holds for all E, p and q.
Yet, this space is clearly not Bayesian, as the agent is not certain of his type
in any of the states.
5 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose ω0 ∈ T(ω). Then, for any E and p, ω ∈ Bp(E) iﬀ ω0 ∈ Bp(E) and
therefore ω0 is in the set on the right hand side of (2). Conversely, suppose
ω0 is in the set on the right hand side of (2). Fix E ∈ Σ0. Then, whenever
ω is in Bp(E) ∩ B1−q(¬E) for some rational p < q, ω0 is also in this event.
Thus t(ω)(E) and t(ω0)(E) belong to the same intervals [p,q] with rational
ends. But this implies that t(ω)(E) = t(ω0)(E). Hence, t(ω) and t(ω0) are
two probability measures that agree on Σ0 and therefore the same probability
measure. Hence ω0 ∈ T(ω).
Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose the agent is certain of his type in state ω, that is, ω ∈ C. Fix E
and p. Then, either ω ∈ ¬Bp(E), or else, by Proposition 1, t(ω)(Bp(E)) = 1,
that is ω ∈ B1(Bp(E)). Thus, ω ∈ ¬Bp(E) ∪ B1(Bp(E)).
Conversely, suppose that ω belongs to the event in the right hand side of
(4), where the intersection is taken over rational p and events E ∈ Σ0. Then,











where the intersection is over rational p and E ∈ Σ0 that satisfy the required









13By Proposition 1, this is equivalent to saying that ω ∈ B1(T(ω)). Therefore
t(ω)(T(ω)) = 1, and thus ω ∈ C.
Proof of Proposition 3
To simplify the notation, we introduce an abbreviation for the event that





We assume that (11) holds, and show that for any given ε > 0 the two
sides of (8) can diﬀer by ε at most.
Choose a sequence of numbers 0 = p0 < p1 < ··· < pm > 1, such
that |pk − pk−1| ≤ ε for k = 1,...,m. Clearly, the events Bpk−1,pk(E) for



















To evaluate the k term in (12) we consider an event F r = Bpk−1(E) ∩
B1−r(¬E) for pk−1 < r < pk. This is the event that the posterior probability
of E is in the interval [pk−1,r]. By (11), rµ(F r) ≥ µ(E ∩ F r) ≥ pk−1 µ(F r).
When r converges to pk the events F r converge monotonically to Bpk−1,pk(E),



































Therefore, the k terms in (12) and (13) have the same bounds and they
can diﬀer by at most the diﬀerence between these bounds, which is bounded
by εµ(Bpk−1,pk(E)). Thus, by (12) and (13), the two sides of (8) can diﬀer
by ε at most.
Proof of Theorems 1 and 2
14Suppose that the prior µ satisﬁes (10). By Proposition 3, µ is an invariant
prior, and therefore to show that the space is Bayesian, it is enough to prove
that the agent is certain of his type. Assume, to the contrary, that he is not.
Then the µ-probability of the complement of C is positive. By Proposition



















But ¬B1(Bp(E))—the event that the agent is not certain of Bp(E)—is the
same as the event that he ascribes positive probability to ¬Bp(E). Hence


















≥ r > 0.
But this is a contradiction, since ¬Bp(E) and the conditioning event are
disjoint.
Conversely, suppose that µ is a prior in a Bayesian belief space. We show


















Now, if ω ∈ ∩n
k=1B
pk
i (Ek), then T(ω) ⊆ ∩n
k=1B
pk
i (Ek), and otherwise,
T(ω) ⊆ ¬ ∩n
k=1 B
pk
i (Ek). Hence, if the agent knows his type at ω, then
t(ω)( ∩n
k=1 Bpk(Ek)) is 1 in the ﬁrst case, and 0 in the other. Therefore,
t(ω)(∩n
k=1Bpk(Ek)∩Em) = ti(ω)(Em) ≥ pm, in the ﬁrst case, and t(ω)(∩n
k=1
Bpk(Ek) ∩ Em) = 0, in the other.
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